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ABSTRACT
Penetration tests on IT systems are sometimes coupled with
physical penetration tests and social engineering. In phys-
ical penetration tests where social engineering is allowed,
the penetration tester directly interacts with the employ-
ees. These interactions are usually based on deception and
if not done properly can upset the employees, violate their
privacy or damage their trust toward the organization and
might lead to law suits and loss of productivity. We propose
two methodologies for performing a physical penetration test
where the goal is to gain an asset using social engineering.
These methodologies aim to reduce the impact of the pene-
tration test on the employees. The methodologies have been
validated by a set of penetration tests performed over a pe-
riod of two years.
Keywords: penetration testing, physical security, method-
ology, social engineering, research ethics
1. INTRODUCTION
A penetration test can assess both the IT security and the
security of the facility where the IT systems are located. If
the penetration tester assesses the IT security, the goal is to
obtain or modify marked data located deep in the organiza-
tions network. Similarly, in testing the physical security of
the location where the IT system is located, the goal of the
penetration test is to obtain a specic asset, such as a laptop
or a document. Physical and digital penetration tests can
be complemented with social engineering techniques, where
the tester is allowed to use knowledge and help from the
employees to mount the attack.
In digital penetration tests the resilience of an employee
is measured indirectly, by making phone queries or sending
fake mail that lure the employee to disclose secret informa-
tion. These tests can be designed in an ethical manner [1]
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and within the legal boundaries [2]. However, measuring
the resilience of an employee against social engineering in a
physical penetration test is direct and personal. When the
tester enters the facility of the organization and directly in-
teracts with the employees, she either deceives the employee,
trying to obtain more information about the goal, or urges
the employee to help her, by letting the tester inside a secure
area or giving the tester a credential. The absence of any
digital medium in the communication with the employees
makes the interaction between the penetration tester and
the employee intense, especially if the employee is asked to
break company policies.
There are three main consequences from personal inter-
action between the tester and the employee. First, the em-
ployee might be stressed by having to choose between help-
ing a colleague and breaking the company policies. Second,
the tester might not treat the employee respectfully. Fi-
nally, when helping the penetration tester to enter a secure
location, the employee loses the trust from the people who
reside in the secure location. For example, employees might
stop trusting the secretary when they nd out she let an
intruder into their oce. To avoid ethical and legal implica-
tions, organizations may avoid physical penetration testing
with social engineering, leaving themselves unaware of at-
tacks where the attacker uses non-digital means to attack
the system.
This paper tackles the problem how to perform a physical
penetration test using social engineering in the most respect-
ful manner, while still getting results that lead to improving
the security of the organization. The contribution of this
paper is two methodologies for physical penetration tests
using social engineering where the goal is to gain possession
of a physical asset from the premises of the organization.
Both methodologies are designed to reduce the impact of
the test on the employees. The methodologies have been
validated by performing 14 live penetration tests over the
last two years, where students tried to gain possession of
marked laptops placed in buildings of two universities in
The Netherlands.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section
2 we present related work and in section 3 we set the re-
quirements for the methodologies. Sections 4 and 5 outline
the methodologies, section 6 provides an evaluation of the
structure of the methodologies and section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
In the computer science literature, there are isolated re-
ports of physical penetration tests using social engineering
[3, 4]. However, these approaches focus completely on the
actions of the penetration tester and do not consider the
impact of the test on the employees.
There are a few methodologies for penetration testing.
The Open-Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OS-
STMM) [5] provides an extensive list of what needs to be
checked during a physical penetration test. However, the
methodology does not state how the testing should be car-
ried out. OSSTMM also does not consider direct interaction
between the penetration tester and the employees. Barret [6]
provides an audit-based methodology for social engineering
using direct interaction between the penetration tester and
an employee. Since this is an audit-based methodology, the
goal is to test all employees. Our methodologies are goal-
based and focus on the security of a specic physical as-
set. Employees are considered as an additional mechanism
which can be circumvented to achieve the goal, instead of
being the goal. Turpe and Eichler [7] focus on safety pre-
cautions while testing production systems. Since a test can
harm the production system, it can cause unforseeable dam-
ages to the organization. In our work the penetration test
of the premises of an organization can be seen as a test of a
production system.
In the crime science community, Cornish [8] provides mech-
anisms how to structure the prosecution of a crime into uni-
versal crime scripts and reasons about mechanisms how to
prevent the crime. We adopt a similar reporting format to
present the results from a penetration test. However, in-
stead of using the crime script to structure multiple attacks,
we use the script to identify security mechanisms that con-
tinuously fail or succeed in stopping an attack.
In social science research, the Bellman report [9] denes
the ethical guidelines for the protection of humans in testing.
The rst guideline in the report states that all participants
should be treated with respect during the test. Finn [10]
provides four justications that need to be satised to use
deception in research. We use the same justications to show
that our methodology is ethically sound.
3. REQUIREMENTS
A penetration test should satisfy ve requirements to be
useful for the organization. First, the penetration test needs
to be realistic, since it simulates an attack performed by a
real adversary. Second, during the test all employees need
to be treated with respect [9]. The employees should not be
stressed, feel uncomfortable nor be at risk during the pene-
tration test, because they might get disappointed with the
organization, become disgruntled or even start legal action.
Finally, the penetration test should be repeatable, reliable
and reportable [6]. We call these the R* requirements:
Realistic - employees should act normally, as they would
in everyday life.
Respectful - the test is done ethically, by respecting the
employees and the mutual trust between employees.
Reliable - the penetration test does not cause productivity
loss of employees.
Repeatable - the same test can be performed several times
and if the environment does not change, the results should
be the same.
Reportable - all actions during the test should be logged
and the outcome of the test should be in a form that permits
a meaningful and actionable documentation of ndings and
recommendations.
These are conicting requirements. For example:
1. In a realistic penetration test, it might be necessary to
deceive an employee, which is not respectful.
2. In a realistic test, arbitrary employees might be social
engineered to achieve the goal, which is unreliable.
3. In a reportable test, all actions of the penetration tester
need to be logged, which is unrealistic.
Orchestrating a penetration test is striking the best bal-
ance between the conicting requirements. If the balance
is not achieved, the test might either not fully assess the
security of the organization or might harm the employees.
We propose two methodologies for conducting a penetra-
tion test using social engineering. Both methodologies strike
a dierent balance between the R* requirements, and their
usage is for dierent scenarios. Both methodologies assess
the security of an organization by testing how dicult it is
to gain possession of a pre-dened asset.
The methodologies can be used to assess the security of
the organization, by revealing two types of security weak-
nesses: errors in implementation of procedural and physical
policies by employees and lack of dened security policies
from the management. In the rst case, the tests should
focus on how well the employees follow the security policies
of the organization and how eective the existing physical
security controls are. In the second case, the primary goal of
the tests is to nd and exploit gaps in the existing policies
rather than in their implementation. For example, a test
can focus on how well the credential sharing policy is en-
forced by employees or can focus on exploiting the absence
of a credential sharing policy to obtain the target asset.
In this paper we present the two methodologies which re-
duce the impact of these tests. The environment-focused
(EF) methodology, measures the security of the environment
where the asset is located. The methodology is suitable for
tests where the custodian (person who controls the asset)
is not subject of social engineering and is aware of the ex-
ecution of the test. One example of such test is evaluating
the security of the assets residing in the oce of the CEO,
but not the awareness of the CEO herself. The custodian-
focused (CF) methodology is more general, and includes the
asset owner in the scope of the test. In this methodology,
the owner is not aware of the test. The CF methodology
is more realistic, but it is less reliable and respectful to the
employees.
4. ENVIRONMENT-FOCUSED METHOD
First, we dene the actors in the environment-focused
methodology. Then, we introduce all events that take place
during the setup, execution and aftermath of the penetra-
tion test. Finally, we validate the methodology by conduct-
ing three penetration tests and present some insights from
the experience.
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Figure 2: Sequence of events in the environment-focused methodology. Each box represents an event which
happens in sequence or parallel with other events. For example, event 3 happens after event 2 and in parallel
with events 1 and 4.
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Figure 1: Actors in the EF methodology
4.1 Actors
The penetration test involves four dierent actors.
Security ocer - an employee responsible for the security
of the organization. The security ocer orchestrates the
penetration test.
Custodian - an employee in possession of the assets, sets
up and monitors the penetration test.
Penetration tester - an employee or a contractor trying to
gain possession of the asset without being caught.
Employee - person in the organization who has none of
the roles above.
The actors and the relations between them are shown in
Figure 1. The majority of actors treat each other with re-
spect. No respect relation between two actors means either
the actors do not interact during the penetration test (for
example between the tester and the custodian) or do not
have a working relationship (between the penetration tester
and the employee). In this methodology, the tester deceives
the employee during the penetration test, presented in the
gure with a dashed line.
4.2 Setup
Figure 2 provides the sequence of events that take place
during the setup, execution and closure of the penetration
test. During all three stages of the penetration test, employ-
ees should behave normally (1 in Figure 2).
As in other penetration testing methodologies, before the
start of the test, the security ocer sets the scope, the rules
of engagement and the goal (2 in Figure 2). The goal is
gaining physical possession of a marked asset. The scope of
the testing provides the penetration tester with a set of lo-
cations she is allowed to enter, as well as business processes
in the organization she can abuse, such as processes for is-
suing a new password, or processes for adding/removing an
employee. The rules of engagement restrict the penetration
tester to the tools and means she is allowed to use to reach
the target. These rules, for example, dene if the tester is
allowed to force doors, to break windows or to use social
engineering.
The custodian rst signs an informed consent form and
then sets up the environment, by marking an asset in her
possession and installing monitoring equipment.
The asset should not be critical for the daily tasks of the
custodian or anyone else, including the organization. Thus,
when the penetration tester gains possession of the asset,
the productivity of the custodian using the asset and the
process ow of the company will not be aected. The custo-
dian leaves the asset in her oce or an area without people
(storage area, closet). If the custodian shares an oce with
other employees, the monitoring equipment should be po-
sitioned in such a way that it records only the asset and
not the nearby employees. The custodian knows when the
test takes place, and has sucient time to remove/obscure
all sensitive and private assets in her room and around the
marked asset (3 in Figure 2).
Meanwhile, the penetration tester needs to sign the rules
of engagement (4 in Figure 2). The OSSTMM methodol-
ogy [5] provides a comprehensive list of rules of engagement.
4.3 Execution
The security ocer should choose a trustworthy penetra-
tion tester and monitor her actions during the execution
stage.
Generic Script Attack trace Circumvented
mechanisms
Recommendations
Prepare for the attack Buy a bolt cutter and hide it in a bag.
Scout the building and the oce during
working hours.
Obtain an after working hours access
card.
Access control of the build-
ing entrances during working
hours.
Credential sharing policy.
Keep entrance doors to the build-
ing locked at all time.
Provide an awareness training
concerning credential sharing.
Enter the building Enter the building at 7:30 AM, before
working hours.
Hide the face from CCTV at the entrance
using a hat.
CCTV pre-theft surveil-
lance.
Increase the awareness of
the security guards during
non-working hours.
Enter the oce Wait for the cleaning lady. Pretend you
are an employee who forgot the oce key
and ask the cleaning lady to open the of-
ce for you.
Challenge unknown people
to provide ID.
Credential sharing policy.
Reward employees for discover-
ing intruders.
Identify and get the as-
set
Search for the specic laptop. Get the
bolt cutter from the bag and cut the
Kensington lock. Put the laptop and the
bolt cutter in the bag.
Kensington lock. Get stronger Kensington locks.
Use alternative mechanism for
protecting the laptop.
Leave the building with
the laptop
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Figure 3: Reporting a successful attempt. The gure shows an example of a generic script instantiated
with an attack trace. First we dene the generic script, which encompasses the stages of all attacks. In the
example, they are: enter the building, enter the oce, identify and get the asset, and exit the building. For
each step in a trace, we identify both the mechanisms (if any) that were circumvented and mechanisms that
stopped an attack. For failed attacks, the table shows which mechanisms were circumvented up to the failed
action, and the mechanism that successfully stopped the attempt.
1. Social engineer night pass from an employee.
2. Enter the building early in the morning.
3. Social engineer the cleaning lady to access the oce.
4. Cut any protection on the laptop using a bolt cutter.
5. Leave the building during oce hours.
Figure 4: Example of an attack scenario
When the penetration test starts, the tester rst scouts
the area and proposes a set of attack scenarios (5 in Figure
2). An example of an attack scenario is presented in Figure
4. The proposed attack scenarios need to be approved rst
by the custodian (6 in Figure 2) and then by the security
ocer (7 in Figure 2). The custodian is directly involved in
the test and can correctly judge the eect of the scenario on
her daily tasks and the tasks of her colleagues. The security
ocer needs to approve the scenarios because she is aware
of the general security of the organization and can better
predict the far-reaching consequences of the actions of the
tester.
If the custodian or the security ocer disapprove an attack
scenario, they need to evaluate the scenario and estimate the
success. The tester puts in the report that the scenario was
proposed, the reasons why the scenario was turned down
and the opinion of all three roles on the success of the sce-
nario. In this way the scenario although not executed, it
is documented including the judgment on the eectiveness
of the attack by the security ocer, the custodian and the
tester.
After approval from the custodian and the security ocer,
the tester starts with the execution of the attack scenarios (8
in Figure 2). The custodian and the security ocer remotely
monitor the execution (9 in Figure 2) through CCTV and
the monitoring equipment installed by the custodian.
The penetration tester needs to install wearable monitor-
ing equipment to log her actions. The logs serve three pur-
poses. First, they ensure that if an employee is treated with
disrespect there is objective evidence. Second, the logs prove
that the penetration tester has followed the attack scenar-
ios, and nally, the logs provide information how the mech-
anisms were circumvented, helping the organization repeat
the scenario if needed.
4.4 Closure
After the end of the test, the penetration tester prepares
a report containing a list of attack traces. Each attack trace
contains information of successful or unsuccessful attacks
(10 in Figure 2). Based on the report, the security ocer
debriefs both the custodians and any deceived employees
during the test (11 in Figure 2).
Reporting. The attack traces are structured in a report
that emphasizes the weak and the strong security mecha-
nisms encountered during the penetration test, structured
following 25 techniques for situational crime prevention [11].
For dierent domains there are extensive lists of security
mechanisms to enforce the 25 techniques (for example, [12]).
The combination of the attack traces together with the situ-
ational crime prevention techniques gives an overview of the
circumvented mechanisms [13] (Figure 3)
Debrieng the employees and the custodian. After nding
they were deceived by the same organization they work for,
the employees might get disappointed or disgruntled. At
the end of the test the security ocer fully debriefs the cus-
todian and the employees. The debrieng should be done
carefully, to maintain or restore the trust between custodian
and the employees who helped the tester to gain the asset.
4.5 Validation
To test the usability of the physical penetration tests using
social engineering on the employees, we executed a series
of penetration tests following the EF methodology. These
pilots allowed us to gain a clear, rst-hand picture of each
execution stage of the methodology, and draw observations
from the experience.
To avoid bias in the execution of the tests, we did not
perform the tests ourselves, but recruited three teams of
students who were in their rst year of master studies to
steal three laptops from the custodian (the rst author).
We locked the laptops with Kensington locks and hid the
keys in an oce desk. To monitor the laptops, we installed
motion detection web cameras which streamed live feeds to
an Internet server. Since the custodian shares the oce with
four other colleagues, the cameras were positioned in such
a way to preserve the privacy of the colleagues. We told
the colleagues we are doing an experiment, but we did not
reveal the nature nor the goal of the experiment.
Since we knew about the penetration test, we did not
allow the students to gain possession of the laptops in our
presence. During the experiment, we carried on the normal
work, thus the students were forced to carry on the attacks
after working hours or during the lunch break.
The three teams scouted the building and wrote a list of
attack scenarios they want to execute. Eventually, all three
teams successfully obtained the target laptop and wrote the
successful and unsuccessful attempts in the format shown
in Figure 3. After the penetration test, we individually de-
briefed the security ocer, the security guard, the secretary
and the colleagues.
4.6 Lessons learned from the penetration tests
The observations are result of our experience with the
penetration tests using qualitative social research and might
not generalize to other social environments. However, the
observations provide an insight of the issues that arose while
using the methodology in practice.
The attack scenarios should be exible. Although the stu-
dents provided scenarios prior to all attacks, in all cases
they were forced to deviate from them, because the target
employee was either not present or was not behaving as ex-
pected. Attack scenarios assure the custodian and the secu-
rity ocer that the actions of the penetration tester are in
the scope of the test, but at the same time there should be
some freedom in adapting the script to the circumstances.
The methodology does not respect the trust relationship
between the custodian and the employees. After the pene-
tration test, the custodian knows which employees were de-
ceived, and the trust relationship between them is disturbed.
For example, if the secretary lets the penetration tester into
the oce of the custodian, the custodian might not be able
to trust her again.
During the penetration test, separating the custodian from
the employees is hard. Whenever the students approached a
colleague from the oce, the rst reaction of the colleague
was to call the custodian and ask for guidance. This led to
uncomfortable situations where we were forced to shut down
our phones and ignore e-mails while outside the oce.
Debrieng proved to be dicult. After the test, we fully
disclosed the test to all involved employees. Debrieng the
security guard who opened the oce for the penetration
testers three times was the hardest. During the debrieng
we focused on the benets of the penetration test to the
university and their help setting up the test. After the de-
brieng, we concluded that we caused more stress to the
guard during the debrieng than the students had caused
during the penetration test.
5. CUSTODIAN-FOCUSED METHOD
In the EF methodology, the custodian is aware of the pen-
etration test. The knowledge of the penetration test changes
her normal behavior and thus inuences the results of the
test. Since the asset belongs to the custodian, and the as-
set is in the oce of the custodian, in many environments
it is desirable to include the custodian's resistance to social
engineering as part of the test.
After performing the rst series of penetration tests, we
revisited and expanded the environment-focused methodol-
ogy. The CF methodology can be seen as a renement of the
EF methodology, based on the experience from the rst set
of penetration tests. In the CF methodology the custodian
is not aware of the test, making the methodology suitable
for penetration tests where the goal is to check the overall
security of an area including the level of security awareness
of the custodian.
5.1 Actors
There are six actors in the CF methodology.
Security ocer - an employee responsible for the security
of the organization.
Coordinator - an employee or contractor responsible for
the experiment and the behavior of the penetration tester.
The coordinator orchestrates the whole penetration test.
Penetration tester - an employee or contractor who at-
tempts to gain possession of the asset without being caught.
Contact person - an employee who provides logistic sup-
port in the organization and a person to be contacted in case
of an emergency.
Custodian - an employee at whose oce the asset resides.
The custodian should not be aware of the penetration test
(1 in Figure 5).
Employee - person in the organization who has none of
the roles above. The employee should not be aware of the
penetration test (2 in Figure 5).
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Figure 6: Actors in the CF methodology
Figure 6 shows the actors and the relations between them.
In this methodology, the penetration tester deceives both,
the employees and the custodian. Moreover, the contact
person also needs to deceive the custodian. These relations
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Figure 5: Sequence of events in the custodian-focused methodology
are discussed in greater depth in section 6.
5.2 Setup
At the beginning, similar to the EF methodology, the se-
curity ocer initializes the test by dening the target, scope
and the rules of engagement. The security ocer at this
point assigns a coordinator for the penetration test and pro-
vides the coordinator with marked assets and equipment for
monitoring the assets (3 in Figure 5). The marked assets
should be similar to the asset of interest for which the se-
curity is measured. The monitoring equipment should be
non-intrusive and its purpose is to have additional informa-
tion on the activities of the penetration tester.
The penetration tester should sign the rules of engage-
ment (Appendix A) before the start of the execution stage
(4 in Figure 5). The coordinator selects a number of con-
tact people and provides them with the marked assets and
the monitoring equipment (5 in Figure 5). Furthermore, the
coordinator provides a cover story which explains why the
custodian is given the asset. The contact person selects a
number of custodians based on the requirements from the
security ocer (random, specic roles, specic characteris-
tics) and distributes the marked assets and the monitoring
equipment to the custodians. After giving the monitoring
equipment, the contact person should get a signed informed
consent (Appendix B) from the custodians (6 in Figure 5).
If the asset can store data, the document must clearly state
that the custodian should not store any sensitive nor pri-
vate data in the asset. Before the penetration test starts,
the coordinator distributes a list of penetration testers to
the security ocer, and a list of asset locations to the pen-
etration tester (7 in Figure 5).
5.3 Execution
The rst steps of the execution stage are similar to the
previous methodology. The penetration tester scouts the
area and proposes attack scenarios (8 in Figure 5). The
coordinator and later the security ocer should agree with
these scenarios before the tester starts executing them (9
and 10 in Figure 5). After approval from both actors, the
tester starts executing the attack scenarios. If a penetration
tester is caught or a termination condition is reached, the
penetration tester immediately informs the contact person.
Thus, if the custodian stored sensitive data in the asset, the
data is not exposed.
When the tester gains possession of the target asset, she
informs the contact person and the coordinator and returns
the asset to the contact person (11 in Figure 5). The contact
person collects the monitoring equipment and informs the
security ocer (12 in Figure 5). If the tester gains posses-
sion of the asset without the knowledge of the custodian, the
contact person needs to reach the custodian before the cus-
todian reaches the oce and explain to the custodian that
the test is terminated. The security ocer obtains surveil-
lance videos from the CCTV and access logs and gives them
to the coordinator (13 in Figure 5).
5.4 Closure
After the execution stage, the penetration tester writes
a report of all attempts, both failed and successful, in the
form of attack traces and gives them to the coordinator (14
in Figure 5). The coordinator has two tasks. First, she
collects the marked assets and monitoring equipment from
the contact person (15 in Figure 5) and returns them to the
security ocer. Second, the coordinator debriefs the security
ocer and the custodians and provides the custodian a form
of reward for helping in the assessment (16 in Figure 5).
Not all employees that were social engineered should be
debriefed. Employees who were treated with respect and
to whom the penetration tester did not cause discomfort
during the interaction should not be debriefed, because the
debrieng can cause more stress than the interaction with
the penetration tester. The decision which employees need
to be debriefed lies with the security ocer, and is based
on the logs from the penetration tester and the monitoring
equipment. The criteria on which employees need to be
debriefed are presented in greater detail in Section 6.
Debrieng the custodians. All custodians should be de-
briefed, because they sign an informed consent at the be-
ginning of the test. However, to preserve the trust between
the custodian and the employees, the custodian should not
know which employee contributed to the attack.
Three elements should be considered before the debrief-
ing. First, the custodians were deceived by the organization
they work for (more specically, by the contact person). Sec-
ond, in case of direct interaction, their privacy might be
violated by the logging equipment from the tester. Third,
they might be stressed from the penetration test either di-
rectly, through interaction with the penetration tester, or
indirectly, by nding their asset is gone before the contact
person reaches them.
The debrieng should focus on the contribution of the
custodian in nding the security vulnerabilities in the or-
ganization, and the custodian should be rewarded for the
participation.
5.5 Validation
We orchestrated eleven penetration tests with the custodian-
focused methodology. As targets we used eleven marked lap-
tops that just came out on the market. We selected three
PhD students as contact persons, who chose eleven friends
as custodians (snowball sampling [14]). The custodians were
ten PhD students and one professor spread across two uni-
versities, in nine dierent buildings.
We gave the laptops to the custodians for two weeks us-
age. The cover story was that the universities are interested
in the usability of the new generation of laptops. Thus, we
needed to monitor the behavior of the custodian and mea-
sure their satisfaction level. The contact persons explained
that they cannot tell the custodians exactly which behavior
we measure, since it might change the results of the exper-
iment. We instructed the custodians to lock the laptops
with a Kensington lock and to keep them in the oce. To
reduce the risk of data leakage and loss of productivity, we
asked the custodians not to store any private or work data
on the laptops. Later, thirty-three master students in com-
puter security, divided in eleven teams of three, tried to gain
possession of the laptops by using physical and social means.
Figure 7: Recording from the validation of the EF method-
ology. The student provided to the janitor a fake email stat-
ing he needs to collect a laptop from the custodian oce. The
janitor let the student into the oce and helped him nd the
key from the Kensington lock.
Figure 8: Recording from the validation of the CF method-
ology. The student went to the oce early in the morning,
disguised as an employee who forgot his key. The cleaning
lady let the student in. The student used a bolt cutter to
remove the Kensington lock.
The students took roles as service desk employees, stu-
dents that urgently needed a laptop for a few hours or co-
ordinator representatives. The students used mobile phones
and pocket video cameras to record the conversation with
the employees. In one case they took a professional camera
and a cameraman, and told the custodian the recording is
part of a study to measure the service quality of the service
desk.
The resistance of the employees varied. In ve cases, the
employees gave the laptop easily after being showed a fake
email and being promised they will get the laptop back in
a few hours. In two cases the custodian wanted a conr-
mation from a supervisor or the coordinator. In one case a
colleague of the custodian got suspicious and sent an email
to the campus security. Since only the main security ocer
knew about the penetration test, in few hours the security
guards were all alerted and started searching for suspicious
students.
However, in two cases the students were not able to social
engineer the custodian directly and were forced to look for
alternative approaches. For example, in one of the cases
the students entered the building before working hours. At
this time the cleaning lady cleans the oces, and under the
assumption it is their oce let the students inside. After
entering the oce, the students cut the Kensington lock and
left the building before the custodian arrived.
We debriefed only the custodians through a group pre-
sentation, where we explained the penetration test and its
goal.
5.6 Lessons learned from the validation
It should be specied in advance which information the
penetration tester is allowed to use. For example, the pen-
etration tester should not use knowledge about the cover
story used by the contact person. During the validation,
six penetration testers used knowledge of the cover story to
convince the custodian to hand in the laptop. Thus, these
tests were less realistic.
Panic situations need to be taken into consideration in the
termination conditions. Several times the custodian or an
employee got suspicious and raised an alarm. Since only the
security ocer knew about the experiment, and the other se-
curity personnel was excluded, news of people stealing lap-
tops spread in a matter of hours. In these situations the
coordinator should react quickly and explain to the employ-
ees that the suspicious activity is a test.
The penetration test cannot be repeated many times. If
a custodian participated in the penetration test once, she
knows what will happen. The same holds for the employees
she told about the experiments and the employees that were
socially engineered.
6. EVALUATION
In this section we compare both methodologies against the
R* requirements. The satisfaction of the requirements is de-
ned by the rules of engagement, which attack scenarios are
approved for execution, and the structure of the method-
ologies. Less restrictive rules of engagement and approving
more invasive attack scenarios make the penetration test
more realistic, but make the test less reliable and respectful
to the employees. The evaluation below assumes these two
elements are tuned to the risk appetite of the organization
and focuses only on the structure of the methodologies.
Reliable: In the EF methodology, the penetration tester
gains possession of a non-critical asset which the custodian
is prepared to lose. Thus, the result of the penetration test
will not aect the productivity of the custodian. In the
CF methodology, the productivity of the custodian may be
aected, since the custodian does not know the asset will
be stolen. The informed consent is a mechanism to avoid
productivity loss, since it explicitly states not to use the
marked asset for daily tasks nor store sensitive information
on the asset. In both methodologies, the productivity of
other employees is not aected, since the penetration tester
does not gain possession of any of their belongings without
their approval.
Repeatable: The repeatability of any penetration test us-
ing social engineering is questionable, since human behavior
is unpredictable. Checking if a penetration test is repeatable
would require a larger set of tests on a single participant, and
a larger number of participants in the test.
Reportable: The approach used in reporting the results
of the penetration test completely covers all information
needed to perform the attack in a real-life situation and
provides an overview of what should be improved to thwart
such attempts. The logs from the tester and the monitoring
equipment installed by the custodians provide detailed infor-
mation on all actions taken by the penetration tester, giving
a clear overview of how the mechanisms are circumvented.
EF methodology CF methodology
Reliable +++ ++
Repeatable - -
Reportable +++ +++
Respectful: actors ++ +
Respectful: trust relations - ++
Realistic + +++
Figure 9: Evaluation of both methodologies
Respectful: Both methodologies should respect all the em-
ployees and the trust relationships between them.
In physical penetration testing, the social engineering el-
ement is more intense than in digital penetration testing
because the interaction between the penetration tester and
the employee is direct, without using any digital medium.
Baumrind [15] considers deception of subjects in testing as
unethical. The National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
also clearly states this in their rst rule of ethical princi-
ples: "Respect for persons" [9].
However, some tests cannot be executed without decep-
tion. Finn [10] denes four justications that need to be met
do make deception acceptable: (1) The assessment cannot
be performed without the use of deception. (2) The knowl-
edge obtained from the assessment has important value. (3)
The test involves no more than minimal risk and does not
violate the rights and the welfare of the individual. Min-
imal risk is dened as: "the probability and magnitude of
physical or psychological harm that is normally encountered
in the daily lives" [16]. (4) Where appropriate, the subjects
are provided with relevant information about the assessment
after participating in the test. Physical penetration testing
using social engineering can never be completely respectful
because it is based on deception. However, the deception in
both methodologies presented in this paper is justiable.
The rst two justications are general for penetration test-
ing and its benets, and have been discussed earlier in the
literature (for example, Barrett [6]). The third justication
states that the risk induced by the test should be no greater
than the risks we face in daily lives. In the EF methodology,
the only actor at risk is the employee. The penetration tester
cannot physically harm the employee because of the rules of
engagement, thus only psychological harm is possible. If the
employees help the penetration tester voluntarily, the risk
of psychological harm is minimal. The logging equipment
assures the interaction can be audited in a case of dispute.
In the CF methodology, an additional actor at risk is the
custodian. The only case when the risk is above minimal
for the custodian is if the tester gains possession of the asset
without custodian's knowledge. When the custodian nds
the asset missing, her stress level might increase. Therefore
it is crucial for the contact person to reach the custodian
before custodian learns about the theft.
The fourth justication states that all actors should be de-
briefed after the exercise. In both methodologies, all actors
except the employees are either fully aware of the exercise, or
have signed an informed consent and are debriefed after the
exercise. Similarly to Finn and Jakobsson [1], we argue that
there should be selective debrieng of the employees. De-
brieng can make the employee upset and disgruntled and is
the only event where the risk is higher then minimal. Thus,
an employee should be debriefed only if the security ocer
constitutes the tester did more than minimal harm.
Besides being respectful toward all the participants, the
methodology needs to maintain the trust relations between
the employees. The EF methodology aects the trust be-
tween the custodian and the employees and the employees
and the organization. This is a consequence of the decision
to fully debrief all participants in the test. The CF method-
ology looks at reducing these impacts. First, the custodians
are not told who contributed to the attack. Only the coordi-
nator and the security ocer have this information, and they
are not related to the custodian. Second, the employees are
not informed about the penetration test unless it deemed
necessary. However, the trust between the custodian and
the contact person is shaken. Therefore, the contact person
and the custodian should not know each other prior to the
test.
In conclusion, the CF methodology is less respectful to
the custodian than the EF methodology, because the custo-
dian is deceived and might get stressed when she nds out
the asset is gone. The EF methodology does not preserve
any trust between the employees, the organization and the
custodian. The CF methodology preserves the trust bond
between the custodian and the employees and between the
employees and the organization. However, the trust bond
between the custodian and the contact person may be af-
fected.
Realistic: The EF methodology allows testing the resilience
to social engineering of employees in the organization. Since
the custodian knows about the penetration test, she is not
directly involved during the execution of the test, making
this methodology implementable in limited number of situ-
ations. In the CF methodology, neither the custodian nor
any of the other employees know about the penetration test,
making the test realistic.
One might argue that if the asset is not critical for the em-
ployee, the tests are not realistic. On the other hand, taking
away "real" assets in the penetration tests will clearly cause
loss of production. In the EF methodology, this issue does
not exist, as the employees who may be social-engineered
are not aware of the importance of the target asset. There-
fore, they have no reason to behave dierently toward the
experimental asset than to a "real" asset. However, in the
CF methodology, the value of the asset as perceived by the
custodian might inuence the result of the tests, as the em-
ployee may be more likely to give the asset away if she knows
it is not critical. As future work, we plan to investigate the
eect of the perceived importance of the asset on the results
of such tests.
7. CONCLUSION
Securing an organization requires penetration testing on
the IT security, the physical security of the location where
the IT systems are situated, as well as evaluating the secu-
rity awareness of the employees who work with these sys-
tems. We presented two methodologies for penetration test-
ing using social engineering. The custodian-focused method-
ology improves on the environment-focused methodology in
many aspects. However, the environment-focused method-
ology is more reliable, does not deceive the custodian and
fully debriefs all actors in the test. We provide criteria to
help organizations decide which methodology is more appro-
priate for their environment. We evaluated both method-
ologies through analysis of their structure against a set of
requirements and through qualitative research methods by
performing a number of penetration tests ourselves. This
paper shows that physical penetration tests using social en-
gineering can reduce the impact on employees in the orga-
nization, and provide meaningful and useful information on
the security posture of the organization.
In the future, we will focus on two topics. First, we want
to investigate the eect of the perceived importance of the
asset on the results of the test. We plan to separate the
custodians in two groups and inform one of the groups that
the laptop contains information critical for the organization.
Second, we want to investigate the aspect of safety for both
the employees and the testers. This research will help pen-
etration testers perform tests in potentially hazardous envi-
ronment, such as chemical or nuclear laboratories.
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Appendix A:
Rules of engagement
I, (name of student) agree to perform pen-
etration tests for (name of researcher)
I understand that the participation of is completely vol-
untary. At any time, I can stop my participation.
I fully oblige to the following rules of engagement:
1. I will only execute attacks that are pre-approved by
the researcher and only to an assigned target.
2. I am not allowed to cause any physical damage to uni-
versity property, except for Kensington locks.
3. I am not allowed to physically harm any person as part
of the test.
4. I will video or audio record all my activities while in-
teracting with people during the penetration test as
a proof that no excessive stress or panic is caused to
anyone.
5. If I am caught by a guard of a police ocer, I will not
show any physical resistance.
Signature of researcher: Date:
Signature of student: Date:
Appendix B:
Informed consent
I, (name of employee) agree to participate in
the study performed by (name of the research
group).
I understand that the participation of the study is com-
pletely voluntary. At any time, I can stop my participation
and obtain the data gathered from the study, have it re-
moved from the database or have it destroyed.
The following points have been explained to me:
1. The goal of this study is to gather information of lap-
top usage. Participation in this study will yield more
information concerning the habits people have in using
mobile devices.
2. I shall be asked to work for 5 min every day on a
laptop for one month. The laptop will be monitored
and recorded using a keynoter and a web-camera. At
the end of the study, the researcher will explain the
purpose of the study.
3. No stress or discomfort should result from participa-
tion in this study.
4. The data obtains from this study will be processed
anonymously and can therefore not be made public in
an individually identiable manner.
5. The researcher will answer all further questions on this
study, now or during the cause of the study.
Signature of researcher: Date:
Signature of employee: Date:
